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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

WAYMON RAY HAMILTON,

:

Case No. 900254-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of two counts of
unlawful sexual intercourse, both third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-401 (1990).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp.^1990), as the appeal is from a district court
in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a first degree
felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was defendant denied his sixth amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel?

Review of this issue is based

on a determination of whether counsel's performance was deficient
and whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v.
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

2.

Did defendant preserve for appellate review the

issue that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to
dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief?

In order to

preserve an issue for review, a preservation of that specific
claim of error must be made part of the trial court record.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 7, 1989, defendant was charged with two
counts of unlawful sexual intercourse, both third degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-401 (1990)
(Record [hereafter R.] at 19). At the time of preliminary
hearing, the State filed an amended information with the same
charges but alleging different dates (R. at 17 and 20).

Glen J.

Ellis was retained as counsel for defendant (R. at 4).
Prior to trial, counsel filed a notice of taking of
deposition (R. at 8), a motion for bill of particulars (R. at 1114), and two notices of alibi defense (R. at 21-24 and 29).
Counsel also filed a motion in limine to restrict use of personal
correspondence between defendant and the victim. (R. at 57-58).

A

ruling on the motion in limine is not in the record; however, the
letters which defendant sought to suppress were not offered into
evidence at trial.

The victim did testify as to the letters and

their content (Transcript of trial [hereafter Tr.] at 54-55).
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The matter came on for trial by jury on March 19, 1990,
in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, with the Honorable Boyd L. Park, district judge,
presiding (R. at 91- 95). The jury found defendant guilty as
charged (R. at 95 and 89-90).

Counsel filed a motion to sentence

under the next lower category of offense as provided by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990) (R. at 98-99) and a motion to arrest
judgment (R. at 100-101).

The court denied the motion to arrest

judgment and granted the motion to sentence under the next lower
category (R. at 117-118).

On April 27, 1990, the court sentenced

defendant to two concurrent terms of one year in the Utah County
jail.

The sentence was suspended and defendant placed on

probation for a period of thirty-six months upon certain
conditions imposed by the court (R. at 117-19).
On April 27, 1990, Phil L. Hansen signed a notice of
appearance as counsel for defendant (R. at 120-21).

Defendant

received a certificate of probable cause and was released from
custody pending this appeal (R. at 126-27).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Erin Allred was 13 years old when she met defendant in
1985 at a time when she and a friend provided dinner for
defendant's family at the birth of defendant's child (Transcript
[hereafter Tr.] at 19). In the winter of 1987-88, defendant
coached a church basketball team for young women of fifteen to
sixteen years of age (Tr. at 20).

Erin, who was fifteen years

old, was not a member of the team because she played on a school
team; however, she did go to the church ball practices and helped
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manage the team (Tr. at 18-20).

Erin considered defendant a

friend and would join in the social gatherings defendant
conducted at his house for the members of the team (Tr. at 22).
She trusted defendant, viewing him like a big brother (Tr. at
23).

Defendant was 26 years old during this time (Tr. at 18 and

110 and State's Exh. #2).
As the basketball season progressed, defendant began
singling out Erin for attention, telling her that she meant the
most to him of any girl on the team (Tr, at 25). Defendant began
hugging, kissing, and holding Erin, once asking her to go into
the bedroom with him; she declined (Tr. at 25 and 21).

After the

basketball season ended, Erin and one of her friends continued to
visit defendant's home (Tr. at 33). At one point, defendant told
Erin that he would wait for her to graduate from high school and
then he would divorce his wife (Tr. at 35).
On approximately June 3, 1988, Erin attended the last
day of the ninth grade and left school at noon (Tr. at 38).
Defendant had told her the night before to come to his house
after school and she did so, after stopping at her own home for a
few minutes (Tr. at 39). When she arrived at defendant's home,
he was the only

one there

(Tr.

at 40).

She sat

on the couch and

leafed through the yearbook that she had received; defendant sat
down next to her and took the yearbook from her (Tr. at 41).
Defendant laid Erin on the floor and started to remove her shorts
and underpants (Tr. at 41-42).

Defendant kissed and fondled Erin

and removed his own shorts (Tr. at 43-44).

He inserted his penis

into her vagina, causing pain, and eventually ejaculated onto her
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stomach (Tr, at 44-45)*

Erin had not had sexual intercourse

before and when she became "restless," he told her to be patient
and "wait until he was done," (Tr. at 46 and 62). When defendant
completed the intercourse, he told her to get cleaned up and
dressed, which she did, and then she went home (Tr. at 47-48).
Approximately August 26, 1988, Erin attended Orem High
School.

She remembered the date because it was the first home

football game of the season.

Defendant, who was preparing to

move to California, telephoned Erin and asked if she had tool to
take apart his waterbed (Tr. at 48). At approximately 12:30
p.m., Erin took a screwdriver to defendant's house; she found
defendant alone in the home, asleep on the living room floor (Tr.
at 48-50).

Defendant had just finished showering and had a towel

wrapped around him (Tr. at 50). Defendant awoke and Erin laid
down beside him on the floor (Tr. at 51). Defendant took his
towel off and removed Erin's clothing (Tr. at 51-52).

He then

had sexual intercourse with her, which included penetration and
ejaculation (Tr. at 52).
Defendant denied having intercourse with Erin, claiming
that he was not at home either of the days that Erin testified
the intercourse occurred (Tr. at 130-31 and 135).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's claims that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance are not supported by specific
demonstrations of deficient performance; neither has defendant
alleges or demonstrated how trial counsel's performance
prejudiced him.

Because of defendant's failure to support his
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claims, this Court should reject defendant's ineffectiveness
claims.
Defendant did not preserve for appellate* review the
specific issue of insufficient evidence.

At trial, counsel moved

to dismiss on the basis that the charged acts of intercourse
could not have occurred as the victim testified that they did.
On appeal, defendant claims that the motion to dismiss should
have been granted because the State had not proven an element of
the offense, i.e., that the offense occurred in the state of
Utah.

This specific claim was never raised below.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COUNSEL'S ACTIONS DID NOT VIOLATE
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The specifics of defendant's claim that he was afforded

ineffective assistance of counsel are not entirely clear.
Defendant's litany of the proceedings found on pages 8 through 15
of his brief seems to imply that trial counsel's actions, and
failures to act, were bad; however, specific analysis as to the
error of these actions or failures to act is lacking.

As nearly

as appellee can tell, defendant is generally claiming that his
trial counsel was ineffective because (1) he failed to object to
the introduction of evidence of "unrelated instances" which were
not necessary to prove the elements of the crimes charged; (2) he
failed to seek assistance from the court when his attempts to
depose the victim were rebuffed; (3) he failed to move for a new
trial; and (4) he failed to persuade the county attorney's office
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to require that the victim receive a medical examination to
determine if her claim of virginity prior to intercourse with
defendant was true.

While defendant may be claiming other errors

by trial counsel, the claims are couched in terms such as "Mr.
Ellis still did not file any motion that would have been filed by
any efficient [sic] defense counsel."

(Brief of Appellant

[hereafter Br. of App.] at 15). Such broad conclusory arguments
make it difficult for the State to respond.

The State is left in

the position of trying to discern the precise nature of the
errors claimed, fashion defendant's argument, then refute the
argument.

This brief will respond to the four issues noted above

which are at least specific enough to make out a claim.
The accepted standard for a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), and has been adopted by the courts of this
state.

In State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986), the Utah

Supreme Court said:
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's
representation falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
• . •

Furthermore, any deficiency must be
prejudicial to defendant.
723 P.2d at 405 (citations omitted).
In State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the Strickland standard as consistent with
its previous holdings regarding effective assistance of counsel.
699 P.2d at 1203 (citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109
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(Utah 1983)).

According to the court in Lairby, the burden of

proof lies with the defendant and counsel's ineffectiveness must
be a demonstrable reality, not a speculative matter.
1203.

699 P.2d at

Trial strategy or tactics do not rise to the level of

ineffectiveness of counsel simply because they did not produce
the anticipated result.

699 P.2d at 1203. The deficiency in

performance must be prejudicial.

699 P.2d at 1203.

See

Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109; State v. McNichol, 554 P.2d 203, 204
(Utah 1976).

To be prejudicial, there must be a "reasonable

probability" that the outcome would be different if counsel's
performance had not been deficient.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

The Utah Supreme Court has defined reasonable probability as "a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 494).

Mere speculation that an

outcome may have been different is not sufficient.

State v.

Archuletta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Utah 1987).
Defendant's first claim is that trial counsel "failed
to object to many questions which had no foundation, incompetency
[sic], irrelevancy [sic], and/or inmateriatlity [sic], because
they were questions which had nothing to do with the incidences
charged in Count I and Count II of the information.
about unlawful sexual intercourse [sic]."

Both being

(Br„ of App. at 9).

Defendant's brief fails to inform this Court as to what questions
and "unrelated instances" trial counsel should have objected to.
Defendant does not quote any of these objectionable materials and
his record cites are to whole blocks of testimony on direct or
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cross examination.

From this, he asks this Court to ferret out

the material which trial counsel allegedly should have objected
to.

For example, defendant states
Mr. Ellis permitted the prosecutor to go
into all of these other instances about which
he claims were unrelated [sic] to the
elements of crimes charged. . . . Yet, Mr.
Ellis never objected to her testimony about
these other instances. (Tr. T. 17 to 56,direct examination.)

(Br. of App. at 9-10).

The testimony cited by defendant contains

the entire direct examination of the victim, including the
testimony of two acts of sexual intercourse which were the basis
of the two charges.

Defendant does not inform this Court what

the allegedly objectionable material is, either by quoting the
testimony of these "other instances" or by citing to specific
transcript pages on which they can be found.

Defendant merely

asks this Court to "read the entire transcript to determine the
gross errors of Mr. Ellis being an inefficient [sic] defense
counsel."

(Br. of App. at 17).
The purpose of the Strickland-Frame test "is simply to

insure that defendant receives a fair trial."
405.

Frame, 723 P.2d at

In determining the fairness of a defendant's trial, this

Court "need not determine whether counsel's performance was
deficient if defendant fails to satisfy his burden of showing
that he suffered unfair prejudice as a result of the alleged
deficiencies."

Id. (footnote omitted).

If a defendant has made

no effort to demonstrate any prejudice which he suffered as the
result of ineffective counsel, his claim must fail.
It is not enough to claim that the alleged
ineffectiveness had some conceivable impact
-9-

on the outcome of the trial. The claim may
not be speculative, but must demonstrate a
reality sufficient to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised reasonable
professional judgment.
State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988) (footnote
omitted).

As in Lovell, "defendant has made no effort to

delineate any prejudice he suffered as the result of
ineffectiveness of counsel."

Id.

He has not even attempted to

"affirmatively show that a 'reasonable probability' exists that,
but for counsel's error, the result would have been different."
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.

Because defendant has failed to show

with specificity how trial counsel's performance was deficient,
and failed to even allege how the "deficiencies" affected the
outcome of his trial, this Court should reject defendant's claim.
Defendant's next apparent ineffectiveness claim
concerns trial counsel's attempt before trial to depose the
victim.

Again defendant fails to demonstrate how this was

deficient performance or how he was prejudiced by trial counsel's
conduct in this area.

Evidently, trial counsel filed a motion

for discovery which was complied with by the county attorney's
office (Sentencing Transcript [hereafter Sent. Tr.] at 27).
Trial counsel also filed a notice of taking of deposition and a
motion for bill of particulars prior to preliminary hearing (R.
at 7 and 11). The record does not indicate the results of the
latter notice and motion other than trial counsel's argument at
the hearing on defendant's motion to arrest judgment (Sent. Tr.
at 3-7). Defendant apparently now claims that trial counsel's
actions, or inaction in following up on the notice and motion,
-10-

constituted deficient performance.

Again, the argument is not

clarified for this Court; defendant merely says, "Effecient [sic]
defense counsel would not have been so intimidated.

He would

have sought relief from the court by filing proper motions. . . .
Any efficient [sic] defense counsel would have filed the proper
motions."

(Br. of App. at 13-14 and 15). Defendant does not

indicate what motions trial counsel should have filed.
Neither does defendant affirmatively demonstrate how
these actions, or inactions, by trial counsel prejudiced him.
Defendant has not alleged that a pretrial conversation with or
deposition of the victim would have changed the outcome of his
trial.

Defendant's failure to explain what reasonable

probability exists of a different result had trial counsel acted
differently is fatal to his ineffectiveness claim.
Defendant's assertion that trial counsel was
ineffective because he did not move for a new trial is without
merit for the same reasons.

Defendant merely states that the

judge "practically, [sic] coaxed" counsel to move for a new trial
(Br. of App. at 12-13).

This allegation does not demonstrate

deficient performance or a reasonable probability of a different
trial result absent trial counsel's failure to move for a new
trial.
Finally, defendant appears to claim ineffective counsel
because trial counsel's request that the victim be subjected to a
medical examination was rejected by the county attorney's office.
This claim suffers the same deficiencies of being incomplete and
conclusory as the other claims.

Defendant states that such an
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examination was "absolutely necessary in proving this kind of an
offense, . . .

Mr. Ellis said the alleged victim was a virgin

and that she never had sex with any other man. . . . Yet, Mr.
Ellis still did not file any motion that would have been filed by
any efficient [sic] defense counsel."
cites omitted).

(Br. of App. at 15; record

Defendant has failed to specify what motion

could have been filed and how the failure to file that motion
affected the trial verdict.
All of defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are given in conclusory terms which fail to meet the
Strickland-Frame test.

Defendant has neither shown that trial

counsel's performance was deficient or that there was a
reasonable probability of a different result had counsel acted in
a different fashion.

Consequently, this Court should reject

defendant's ineffectiveness claim.
POINT II
THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE {STATE'S
CASE-IN-CHIEF.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-inchief.

Such a motion is governed by rule 17(c), Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure (1990), which reads:
At the conclusion of the evidence by the
prosecution, . . . the court may issue an
order dismissing any information or
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the
ground that the evidence is not legally
sufficient to establish the offense charged
therein or any lesser included offense.
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While defendant did move to dismiss at the conclusion of the
State's case-in-chief, he did not preserve the specific ground
which he now cites for that motion.
M

A general rule of appellate review in
criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such
claim on appeal." Importantly, the grounds
for the objection must be distinctly and
specifically stated. Here, although
defendant made a general motion to the trial
court to dismiss the "personal gain"
circumstance charged, the grounds he now
raises on appeal were not specifically or
distinctly stated to the court below. Thus,
under the standard noted, they were not
preserved for our review.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in
original) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)).

The only insufficiency in the evidence which defendant

raises on appeal was an alleged failure by the State to prove
that the offense occurred in the state of Utah.

This specific

ground was never raised in the trial court and has not been
preserved for appellate review.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this JZEj^day

of February,

1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
c_

}

lenNE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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